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Abstract
 
Tool use is one of the goal directed actions infants learn efficiently through interacting with
 
adults. This study examines the roles of infants’attention to an adult’s hand and joint
 
engagement with an adult in learning tool use, and describes their development in under-
standing the intention of the adult. In Experiment 1,an experimenter inserted a toy car into
 
an opaque tunnel,then showing how to extract the car by using a hammer. Forty-nine6-,10-,
12-and19-month-olds were then asked to get the car from the tunnel.19-month-olds could use
 
the hammer as a tool by themselves,while more than80％ “Failure”was recorded with the6-,
10-and12-month-olds. In Experiment2,the opaque tunnel was replaced by a transparent one.
Thirty-five6-,10-,and 12-month-olds participated. Success in joint engagement was more
 
observable with the transparent tunnel compared to the opaque one in10-and12-month-olds.
10-month-olds grasped the goal(the car coming out),connecting it to the actor(or her hand
 
holding the hammer), through joint engagement with the adult. These results indicate that
 
interaction with an adult and making the function of a tool transparent to infants both facilitate
 
infant understanding of adult intention and causality with objects.
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Young children in their second year begin to use various types of tools such as spoons,pens,
shovels and ultimately,language. Human infants especially learn tool use efficiently compared
 
to other species. How do they succeed in learning these skills? We approached this question
 
by examining the following two aspects;one is infants’propensity to imitate adults’actions,and
 
the other is the role of adults interacting with the child.
First, imitative learning is considered necessary for children to acquire the conventional
 
use of many cultural artifacts. To
 
he means
 
t
1999),in his work on the social transmission of tool
 
use in chimpanzees,differentiated between imitative learning and emulation learning;young
 
children pay attention to an actor’s behavior or intentions,and successfully imitate the means
 
used, however, primates focus on the salient outcome of an action and reinvent t
 
methods l
 
hrough a process of trial and error. Nagell, Oleguin, and Tomasello (1993) compared
 
chimpanzees and2-year-old children on a tool-use task with two possible  eading the
 
eywords K
( )1
 same end result. They found that the human children used the tool in the same way as the
 
demonstrator,whereas the chimpanzees ignored the demonstrator’s specific method of tool use.
Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa (1999)also suggested that chimpanzees had difficulty
 
noting details of the demonstrator’s body movements performing a manipulation. For humans
 
the goal or intention of the demonstrator is a central part of what they perceive(Tomasello,
1996).
Amano and Kezuka’s study results(1996)concur with these findings,as they showed that
 
human infants even in the first year paid attention to an adult’s hand during object
 
performance. Infants they observed at the ages of7,10and12months reached for an adult’s
 
hand and put their hand on it or the object the hand was holding;they tried to do the same
 
things as the adult. Amano and Kezuka interpreted infants’focusing on the adult’s hand as a
 
prerequisite step in acquiring tool use. Their research also showed a precursor of joint visual
 
attention;infants’orientation to the adult’s hand emerges in the first half of the first year.
Infants seemed to recognize hands as agents of change as early as at the ages of3and4months
(Amano,Kezuka,& Yamamoto,2004).
Other studies have shown that infants in the second half of the first year expect the actions
 
of human hands to be goal directed. Using the habituation paradigm, Woodward (1999)
suggested that even5-month-old infants can begin to construe grasping events as goal directed.
In a modified version of Woodward’s paradigm,Hofer,Hauf,and Aschersleben(2005)reported
 
that 9-month-old infants did not interpret actions performed by a mechanical device as goal
 
directed,however,showing how a human operated the device prior to the test phase enabled
9-month-old infants to interpret the actions as goal-directed,as well. Saxe,Tenenbaum,and
 
Carey(2005)reported that by the age of10months,hands are categorized as an intentional
 
agent;their research showed that 10-and12-month-old infants expect a human hand to be the
 
primary cause of an inanimate object’s motion.
Secondly,and exclusively in human cultural learning,there is the essential role of adults
 
interacting with the child;adults direct children to which aspects of their own actions they
 
should attend. Adults make their children apply specific means (tools)in certain situations,
and give approval or encouragement for the children’s performances as needed. These well-
intentioned demands by adults ensure efficient and successful tool use. However these social
 
factors have received a lesser focus in early cognitive development studies,and infants typically
 
have been observed while exploring and trying to solve a practical problem on their own,
without help or any instruction from others(Goubet,M.,Rochat,P.,Maire-Leblond,C.,& Poss,
S.,2006).
Tomasello,Carpenter,Call,Behne,and Moll (2005)proposed that the crucial difference
 
between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in
 
collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions. They proposed this developmental
 
pathway of infants’understanding and sharing intentions: (1)young infants (3 months)
understand other persons as animate agents and share emotions,(2)9-month-olds understand
 
other persons as goal-directed agents and share goals, (3)14-month-olds understand other
 
persons as intentional agents and share intentions and engage with them collaboratively.
Typically, in the case of tool using, infants need to adjust their handling to specific
( ) Bull.Gunma Pref.Women’s Univ.,36（Feb.2015)2
 
applications,and they are often not able to imitate or produce proper actions by themselves.
Adults perform the model of tool use they want children to acquire,and if the children fail,they
 
control them by literally taking their hands and/or feet and guiding them;in other words,they
 
make them participate in joint engagements with adults. This can be viewed as an early phase
 
of collaborative activities between infants and adults.
Meanwhile,converging literature suggests a close link between infants’action production
 
and understanding others’actions(Sommerville& Woodward,2005;Sommerville,Woodward,
& Needham,2005;Kanakogi& Itakura,2011,Gerson & Woodward,2013). Sommerville and
 
Woodward(2005)suggested that this link is in place by at least10months of age. Sommerville,
Woodward, and Needham (2005) showed that 3-month-old infants’action experience
 
facilitated their perception of others’actions:they focused on the relation between the actor
 
and her goal. Also Kanakogi and Itakura (2011)showed the developmental correspondence
 
between action prediction and motor ability in 4-to 10-month-old infants and adults.
Unlike the actions noted in these studies, joint engagement is not always a voluntary
 
action,but we find that it also might facilitate infants’perception of causality. Tomasello et
 
al.(2005)noted that infants’understanding and sharing intentions is necessary for collaborative
 
engagement. Conversely, however, it might be presumed that infants come to be aware of
 
adults’intentions by sharing action experiences with them.
This study aimed to examine the role of infants’attention to an adult’s hand(or action),
the role of adults’instruction,especially joint engagement with the adult on acquiring tool use,
and what developmental changes in infants’understanding an adult’s intentions took place
 
during this process. We designed the experiments in a social context familiar in daily life.
Experiment 1
 
Our first experiment was carried out with a wide range of ages;6-to 19-month-olds,to
 
examine the process of acquiring tool use, including the preliminary steps toward it, and to
 
clarify(1)the role of infants’attention to the adult’s hand,(2)the role of joint engagement
 
with adults,and (3)the developmental process in infants’understanding the intention of an
 
adult’s action.
Method
 
Participants. Forty-nine infants participated and were divided into four age groups:sixteen
6-month-olds (M＝7.1, range＝6.7-7.6), fifteen 10-month-olds (M＝9.9, range＝9.4-10.2),
ten12-month-olds(M＝12.2,range＝11.7-12.6),and eight 19-month-olds(M＝19.4,range＝
19.0-19.9). An additional three infants were excluded because of fussiness. All infants were
 
recruited from babies who attended a regular health check-up at a local government-funded
 
Health Center in Gunma,Japan.
Setting and Materials. Infants were observed in a partitioned-off area of the health center.
Four video cameras were set up for recording. The first camera focused on the infant’s face.
The second focused on the face of experimenter,the third shot from the infant’s right side,and
 
the fourth recoded from the infant’s left side.
The materials were a miniature toy car,an opaque cardboard tunnel(4cm in diameter,15
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cm in length)and a bamboo hammer(T-shaped with a5cm long handle). The color of all the
 
materials was red. The hammer was used as a tool to push the car through the tunnel,which
 
had been firmly fixed on the table. To push the car into and through the tunnel,the hammer
 
was laid down and operated horizontally,not conventionally,and thus in a way new to the
 
infants.
Procedure. The infants were seated on their mothers’laps and engaged in a face-to-face
 
interaction with the experimenter. The experimenter put the toy car into the tunnel,and then
 
she showed how to get the car from the tunnel by using the hammer to push the car out of the
 
tunnel. She used her left hand to handle the hammer because most infants have right hand
 
preference, and we expected that using her left hand would facilitate coordinated joint
 
engagement in the face to face situations with the infants. During the demonstration phase,she
 
talked to the infants,explaining each scene;“Look!The car is going into the tunnel!”and,“It’s
 
gone!”...“You can get it by doing this,”(showing the hammer). “I’ll show you.... Watch this!”...
“Look,it’s coming...Here it is!”
She repeated the demonstration twice,then put the car into the tunnel and asked the infants
 
to get the car from the tunnel. When the infants could not succeed,she tried to help them in
 
coordinated joint engagement. These trial sessions were repeated until the infants succeeded
 
or would not try anymore(not pay their attention to the trial). A single trial period ran from
 
putting the car in the tunnel to pushing the car out of it. The total number of trials completed
 
depended upon the individual infants.
Coding. The pictures taken by the four cameras were integrated into a single videotape
 
recorder and analyzed frame by frame (1 frame＝1/30 sec). Infants’behavior during the
 
sessions (including the two demonstration sessions)was coded from the videotape.
Each of the infant’s trials (working level with the hammer, tool using level) were
 
categorized as follows:
･Failure:the infants looked at the adult’s face and/or hand,or they tried to manipulate the
 
hammer or the tunnel,but failed to get the car. The experimenter pushed the car through the
 
tunnel.
･Success in joint engagement:the infants were not able to push the hammer through the tunnel
 
to get the car by themselves,and were helped by the adult;then they pushed it together with
 
the adult in joint engagement. In the case of older infants,when inserting the hammer into the
 
tunnel,they found it difficult to adjust the orientation of the two objects,and they needed help;
this intervention was also included under“joint engagement.”
・Success:the infants were able to push the hammer through the tunnel to get the car by
 
themselves.
Each of the infant’s looking and/or touching (including reaching,grasping,picking up,and
 
manipulating)responses to the experimenter’s face,hands and the objects(or objects in hand)
were combined and coded as indexes of their attention. Four stages were chosen from the
 
sequence of events during each trial(see Table1),and the presence/absence of their attention
 
responses were coded in each stage of a trial. We analyzed the frequency of infants’attention
 
responses based on total numbers of the same tool using level trials of each age group. Not
 
taking differences among individuals into consideration,we focused the differences among each
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trial’s level of tool use. A random sample of20％ of the infants was coded by a second coder.
Cohen’s kappa coefficient wasκ＝.73for“Face,”.80for“Hand,”.96for“Hammer,”.77for
“Hand (Hammer),”.78for“Tunnel,”.89for“Hand (Car),”and .76for “Car.” The main
 
coder’s data was used for analyses.
Results & Discussion
 
Infants’tool using level. Figure1shows the percentage of trials as failure,success in joint
 
engagement, and success at each age group. A significant difference was found between
19-month-olds and the younger three age groups (χ?(3)＝60.20,p＜.0001;except “success”
category);“success”first appeared in the 19-month-olds. More than 80％ “Failure”was
 
recorded with the younger three age groups;6,10and12-month-olds. A significant difference
 
was also found among the younger three age groups (χ?(2)＝12.06,p＜.0024). “Success in
 
joint engagement”was more observable in the 12-month-olds (Tukey test for pairwise
 
comparison,p＜.05).
Infants’attention responses to the person, the person (object)?, and the objects. Table 1
shows infants’responses in four stages from the sequence of events during each trial. The
 
percentage means the total appearance ratio calculated based on the total trials of each tool
 
using level in each age group. For each age group, in the different tool using levels,which
 
aspect the infants paid attention to was compared by performing a Fisher’s exact test. The
 
shaded regions in Table 1 show that significant differences (p＜.05)were found between
“Failure”and“Success in joint engagement”of the12-month-olds,and between“Failure”and
”Success”at the19-month-olds. As compared to“Failure”trials,the12-month-olds paid less
 
Figure 1 Tool using level in Experiment 1(Opaque tunnel):Percentage of trials
 
categorized as failure, success in joint engagement, and success;at 6
months(number of total trials＝154),10months(n＝188),12months(n＝
121)and 19months(n＝122).
１ The“person(object)”stands for the conditions in which the experimenter was either holding
 
or pointing to one of the objects. In this case,we cannot determine which infant attention are
 
directing to,the person or the object.
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attention to “Hand”but more attention to “Hammer”at the first stage in “Success in joint
 
engagement”trials. In the second stage,they attended more to“Hand(Hammer),”and in the
 
fourth stage,their attention to“Tunnel”and“Hand(Hammer)”was greater. The19-month
-olds paid less attention to“Face”and“Tunnel(＋Car),”but more attention to“Hammer”at
 
the first stage in “Success”trials. In the second stage, they attended to “Tunnel (＋Car＋
Hammer)”more in order to insert the hammer into it. In the fourth stage,they attended to
“Hand (Hammer)”to pull the hammer out from the tunnel.
For“Failure”trials,the infants’attention responses in the different age groups,except the
19-month-olds,were compared by performing an exact test. The following significant age
 
group differences were found(p＜.05). The6-month-olds paid less attention to“Hammer”at
 
the first stage than other two groups did. They looked at“Face”more in the second stage and
 
paid attention to Tunnel (Hammer)more in the third stage. The 10-month-olds paid less
 
attention to“Hand”at the first stage,and to“Tunnel(＋Car＋Hammer)”at the second stage.
At the third stage,they paid less attention to“Hand(Hammer).” Their percentage of“Hand
(Car)”was less,but of“Car”was higher. The12-month-olds paid more attention to“Hand
(Hammer)”at the second stage,and to“Hand(Hammer)”and“Tunnel”at the fourth stage,
than the other two age groups.
In summary:regardless of the level of tool use,the6-month-olds compared to the other age
 
groups looked at the experimenter’s face in almost all stages,but especially while the adult was
 
acting with the objects. They hardly seemed to notice the car. The10-month-olds noticed the
 
car coming out of the tunnel but they did not return to the hand(hammer)/means after that.
This may be evidence that they could not understand the goal of the action, but that when
 
something new happened in their environment it seemed to attract them. In an imitation
 
paradigm,Carpenter,Call,and Tomasello(2005)pointed out that the results of an action in an
 
environment are especially salient,and so imitators focus first there,and only under certain
 
conditions do they analyze“backward”to means and sub-goals aimed at that external result.
These observations seem to apply to the10-month-olds in this experiment.
The12-month-olds,in contrast,shifted their attention to the hand holding the hammer and
 
the tunnel after they noticed the car coming out. Especially in“Success in joint engagement”
trials, the 12-month-olds attended more to “Hand (Hammer)”when the car was pushing,
“Tunnel”and“Hand(Hammer)”after they recognized the car,and“Hammer”when they were
 
asked to get the car. These results suggest that the 12-month-olds began to understand a
 
causal relation between hammer (tool),tunnel and car (target);they were noticing the goal
(the car coming out)and beginning to connect the means(the hammer pushing)to it through
 
their joint engagements. Finally, the 19-month-olds used the hammer to get the car by
 
themselves;seven eighths of them could insert the hammer into the tunnel and push out the car,
then put the car into the tunnel themselves and push it out again. They enjoyed this sequence
 
of actions repeatedly for more than ten minutes. One of the19-month-olds,however,adhered
 
only to the conventional use of a hammer;he struck the tunnel with the hammer and failed to
 
learn its new usage.
As the opaque tunnel hid the hammer pushing the car from the infants’sight, it was a
 
difficult challenge for infants still in their first year to figure out the function of the hammer
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as a tool. It was clear that the younger infants could not understand the goal of the adult’s
 
action. The older infants(12and19-month-olds)who were capable of imagining that the car
 
was inside the opaque tunnel,noticed the means and/or the outcome. But the younger infants
 
who did not imagine the inside of the tunnel could not notice the causal relation between the
 
means and/or the outcome,and tried to search for the experimenter’s intention(“what is she
 
asking me to do?”)throughout the trials,looking at her face,and her (now empty)hand.
Experiment 2
 
In an adjustment to make the function of the hammer (tool)more comprehensible to
 
infants younger than12months,we substituted a transparent tunnel for the red opaque tunnel
 
in Experiment2. We expected this modification of the previous experiment to help the infants
 
notice the means and the goal of the process more readily than in Experiment 1.
Method
 
Participants. Another 35 infants were recruited from the same Health Center as in
 
Experiment1. All infants were divided into three age groups:thirteen6-month-olds(M＝6.9,
range＝6.5-7.2), thirteen 10-month-olds (M＝10.0, range＝9.4-10.5), and nine 12-month-
olds (M＝12.5,range＝11.3-12.5). No infants were dropped from this experiment.
Setting and Materials. The setting and materials were the same as in Experiment1except
 
for the tunnel. We used a transparent tunnel instead of a red opaque tunnel.
Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1.
Coding. The coding of infants’responses and the assessment of the trials was done in the
 
same way as in Experiment1. A random sample of20％ of the infants was coded by a second
 
coder. Cohen’s kappa coefficient was κ＝.85 for “Face,” .88 for “Hand,” .81 for
“Hammer,”.79for“Hand (Hammer),”.81for“Tunnel,”for .78“Hand (Car)”and for .91
“Car.” The main coder’s data was used for analyses.
Results & Discussion
 
Infants’tool using level. Figure2shows the percentage of trials as failure,success in joint
 
engagement,and success,in each age group. Significant difference was found between the three
 
age groups with tool using level(χ?(2)＝13.04,p＝.0015). “Success in joint engagement”was
 
more observable in the 10-month-olds and the 12-month-olds (Tukey test for pairwise
 
comparison,p＜.05).
Infants’attention responses to the person,the person (object),and the objects. Table2shows
 
infants’responses in the four sequential stages during each trial. The percentage means the
 
total appearance ratio calculated based on the total sessions of each age group and each tool
 
using level. For each age group,the infants’responses in the different tool using levels were
 
compared by performing a Fisher’s exact test. The shaded regions in Table 2 show that
 
significant differences (p＜.05) were found between “Failure” and “Success in joint
 
engagement.” In the first stage, the 10-month-olds paid significantly more attention to
“Hammer”and “Tunnel (＋Car)”in “Success in joint engagement”trials as compared to
“Failure”trials. In the second stage,the attention to“Hand(Hammer)”appeared higher in all
 
three age groups. In the third stage,the10-and12-month-olds attended to“Hand(Hammer)”
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 more. In the fourth stage,the10-month-olds’attention to“Face”was more observable,and the
12-month-olds’attention to“Hand (Hammer)”was higher in “Success in joint engagement”
trials.
For “Failure”trials, the infants’attention responses in the different age groups were
 
compared by performing Fisher’s exact test. The following significant age group differences
 
were found(p＜.05),especially between the6-month-olds and other age groups. The6-month-
olds’looking at “Face”was more observable at the first,second and third stage compared to
 
other two age groups. In the third stage,they paid less attention to“Car”and more attention
 
to“Hand(Hammer)”and“Tunnel(＋Hammer),”and then their responses of“Hand(Car)”
were observed more. In the fourth stage,their attention to“Hand(Hammer)”was lower than
 
that of the 10-month-olds. Regarding “Hand (Hammer)”in the second stage, there were
 
significant differences between the three age groups;the percentage of “Hand (Hammer)”
increased with age. Also,the12-month-olds’percentage of“Tunnel”in the fourth stage was
 
higher than those of the10-month-olds.
These results suggest that the6-month-olds began to recognize the actor as an agent who
 
caused the movement of objects(the car and the hammer);they related the agent (person)to
 
the objects,but it appears that they did not notice either the means or the goal in this situation,
because most did not notice the car coming out of the tunnel,and their gaze,instead,remained
 
on the tip of the hammer inside the tunnel. One6-month-old infant noticed the hammer moving
 
into the tunnel from the right side, and he shifted his gaze to the right, then found the
 
experimenter’s hand holding the hammer. When her hand movement stopped,his gaze moved
 
to the hammer contacting the hand and finally he found the car contacting the tip of the
 
hammer. In general though, these youngest infants tended to pay attention to the moving
 
objects (the car or the hammer or the hand), and they also attended to the experimenter’s
 
empty hand after it had released the objects.
Figure 2 Tool using level in Experiment 2 (Transparent tunnel):Percentage of
 
trials categorized as failure,success in joint engagement,and success;at6
months(total trials＝151),10months(n＝136),and 12months(n＝125).
E.Kezuka and S.Amano：Infants’Understanding the Intention and Goal ( )9
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The10-month-olds began to notice the adult’s goal-directed action;relating between the
 
hammer(tool)and car(target);noticing the goal(the car coming out)and beginning to notice
 
the means (the hammer pushing)through their joint engagements. One10-month-old infant
 
grasped the other side of the tunnel as soon as he saw the experimenter inserting the hammer
 
into the tunnel. Similarly,other 10-month-old infants often grasped or looked into the other
 
side of the tunnel. This anticipation was rarely observed in the6-month-old infants. It was
 
not necessarily the case that temporal order anticipation was not observable in the youngest
 
age group,however,their anticipation did not involve the relevant causal order. For example,
when watching the car put into the tunnel,one infant shifted his gaze to the other side of the
 
tunnel,but without noticing the role of the hammer.
There was no difference between the tool use level of the10-month-olds and the12-month-
olds,but there was a slight difference in their cognition of causality. After noticing the goal
(the car coming out),the10-month-olds looked at the adult’s face and directed their attention
 
to “Person,”whereas the 12-month-olds directed their attention to “Object”, especially the
 
tunnel. The12-month-olds’behavior seemed to be inconsistent;they apparently noticed the
 
goal and means because they looked back to the hand(hammer)after they recognized the car
 
coming, but their attention remained more on the car inside the tunnel rather than on the
 
hammer when they were asked to take the car out of the tunnel;they then put their fingers into
 
the tunnel and tried to get the car. The12-month-olds seemed to recognize the tunnel as an
 
obstacle to getting the car. Putting their fingers into the tunnel may be interpreted as their own
 
action plan to get the car,which seemed to be much easier for them than using the hammer.
It suggests that infants will use their body as a tool before they are able to use objects as a tool.
Experiment 1 versus Experiment 2: Opaque tunnel versus transparent tunnel. We
 
compared the results of Experiment2(transparent tunnel)with those of Experiment1(opaque
 
tunnel in an otherwise identical experimental situation). Significant differences in tool use
 
level were found in the 10-month-olds (Fisher’s exact test, p＜.0001) and 12month olds
(Fisher’s exact test, p＝.0162) (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). “Failure”was significantly
 
decreased and“Success in joint engagement”was more observable with the transparent tunnel
 
compared to the opaque tunnel in both age groups.
For“Success in joint engagement”trials of each age group,the infants’attention behaviors
 
at each stage were compared for both types of tunnels using a Fisher’s exact test (See Table
1and Table2). In the first stage,no significant difference was found between the opaque tunnel
 
and the transparent tunnel experiments in all age groups. In the second stage,the10-month-
olds’attention to “Tunnel (＋Car＋Hammer)”was more observable with the transparent
 
tunnel (p＜.05). In the third stage, the 6-month-olds’attention to “Tunnel (＋Car＋
Hammer)”(p＜.05),the10-month-olds’attention to“Car”(p＜.01),and the12-month-olds’
attention to“Tunnel(＋Car＋Hammer)”(p＜.01)and“Car”(p＜.05)were more observable
 
with the transparent tunnel. Also,with the transparent tunnel,the percentage of“Hand(Car)”
decreased in all age groups(p＜.05). In the fourth stage,10-month-olds’attention to“Face”
and“Hand(Hammer)”was more apparent with the transparent tunnel(p＜.05). In short,in
 
the case of the transparent tunnel,the infants actually witnessed the hammer pushing the car
(the means)and they could easily notice the goal(the car coming out)and connect it to the
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actor. The6-month-olds’attention to “Tunnel (＋Car＋Hammer),”however,indicates that
 
they seem to be slower to notice the hammer moving in the tunnel,compared to the10-month-
olds.
A different pattern was found for each age group for the looking at“Face”responses(see
 
Figure3). The6-month-olds looked relatively often at “Face”in all stages,and they were
 
sensitive to the experimenter’s voice in both tunnel experiments. They were especially
 
attentive to the experimenter’s face while she was showing them the objects. In the10-month-
olds,a difference was found;the percentage of those looking at ‘Face’in the opaque tunnel
 
experiment was the highest in the first stage,whereas the percentage of those looking at‘Face’
in the case of the transparent tunnel was the highest in the fourth stage. In the12-month-olds,
the percentages for both tunnels were the highest in the first stage. For the19-month-olds,the
 
percentages looking at “Face”in the opaque tunnel were the highest in the first and the last
 
stages. These results suggest that the looking behavior at the adult’s“Face”in the first stage
 
indicates the infants’referencing to the experimenter’s communicative intention (“What did
 
you ask me to do?”...“What should I do?”),and that of the last stage indicates their confirming
 
the result of the action(“We/You did that?”...“Look,I did it!”). Similarly,the10-month-olds’
high percentage at the last stage in the transparent tunnel indicates that this experimental
 
situation facilitated infants’understanding the experimenter’s intention,because they seemed
 
Figure 3 Percentage of trials in which infants looking at the experimenter’s face
 
were observed.1st stage:while the car was in the tunnel,2nd stage:while
 
the car was pushed by the hammer,3rd stage:after the car was pushed out
 
of the tunnel,and 4th stage:after infants noticed the car.
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to be confirming their successful efforts with the experimenter;“I did it!”
Infants’relating objects during each trial were calculated as“Examining behaviors.”We
 
considered these examining behaviors to be evidence of their perception of object-object
 
causality. The average occurrence of examining behaviors was higher in “Success in joint
 
engagement”trials rather than “Failure”trials in the 10-month-olds with the transparent
 
tunnel, and in the 12-month-olds and 19-month-olds with the opaque tunnel (Welch t-test,
p＜.01). The results suggest that the infants realized the causality of objects more efficiently
 
through joint engagement with the adult.
Table3shows the total appearance rate of infants’examining behaviors calculated based
 
on the total“Success in joint engagement”trials of each age group. Except for the12-month-
olds and19-month-olds,the examining behaviors hardly appeared at all in the experiment with
 
the opaque tunnel, whereas even the 6-month-old infants in the experiment with the
 
transparent tunnel showed some examining behaviors. The combining behavior for“Hammer
& Car”first appeared in the experiment with the transparent tunnel with all age groups. The
10-month-olds showed more tendency to combine “Tunnel & Hammer”as well with the
 
transparent tunnel rather than with the opaque one(Fisher’s exact test,p＝.094).
Regarding the age differences(see the shaded region of the Table3)in the experiment with
 
the opaque tunnel, the 19-month-olds’examining behaviors of insert (Tunnel＋Car &
Hammer)and pull out (Tunnel& Hammer)were significantly more observable compared to
 
the other age groups (p＜.0001). The 19-month-olds appeared to be able to realize the
 
intended connection between the three objects;tunnel, car and hammer, even in the opaque
 
Note.“Combine(Tunnel& Car)”includes putting the car into the entrance of the tunnel. The shaded regions indicate
 
that the significant differences were found among the three age groups for each tunnel(Opaque:10,12,and 19months.
Transparent:6,10and 12months)(Fisher’s exact test,p＜.05)
Table 3 Infants’examining behaviors in“success in joint engagement”trials (%)
Tunnel  Age(months)
While the car was in the tunnel
(1st stage)
In other stages
(2nd-4th stages)
Tunnel (＋Car)&
Hammer  
Hammer &
Car  Tunnel& Car  Tunnel& Hammer
 
combine  insert  combine  combine  push back  combine  pull out
 
Opaque 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
12 25.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 5.0 15.0 20.0
19 25.0 70.0 0.0 45.0 15.0 5.0 75.0
Transparent 6 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0
10 7.9 5.3 18.4 18.4 2.6 28.9 10.5
12 16.2 0.0 5.4 24.3 5.4 8.1 10.8
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tunnel. The 12- and 19-month-olds’examining the combined (Tunnel & Car) occurred
 
significantly more (p＜.05). In the experiment with the transparent tunnel, examining the
 
combined(Tunnel& Car)significantly appeared at the earlier age of the10-and12-month-
olds (p＜.05). In the 10-month-olds, examining the combined (Tunnel & Hammer) also
 
occurred significantly more (p＜.05) than with the other two age groups. However, the
10-month-olds often presented physically irrelevant combining behavior,such as placing the
 
hammer or the car over the tunnel, releasing the hammer in the other side of the tunnel,or
 
pushing the hammer outside the tunnel. It seemed that they did not understand the spatial
 
relation of the tunnel and the hammer,and the tunnel and the car.
General Discussion
 
The two experiments with6-to19-month-old infants were conducted to examine the role
 
of young infants’attention behavior to the adult’s hand and the role of joint engagement on
 
acquiring tool use, and to describe the developmental process in infants’understanding the
 
intention of the adult’s action.
Experiment paradigm to study infant intention understanding. First, we propose the
 
distinction,which is not always clearly made and discussed,between object-oriented intention
 
in what has been referred to as “goal directed intention”commonly, and person-oriented
 
intention in what Tomasello et al.(2005)called“communicative intention”. In our experiment
 
as well as many other intention or imitation studies,the experimenter(a real person)provided
 
the model of the performance, using objects with the infants. This experimental setting
 
inevitably creates a nesting structure of intentions;the experimenter is facing the infants with
 
a particular communicative intention (person-oriented)and she also has a goal directed
 
intention(object-oriented)in her performance in this social context. From this point of view,
as in Meltzoff’s study(1995),frequently referred in other intention studies,an experimenter’s
 
intentions are quite complex. This study showed that 18-month-old children understood the
 
other’s intention and accomplished his/her failed half way acts. Meltzoff said that“his actual
 
intent was to give the impression that he was trying to produce the target,”i.e.his actual goal
 
directed intention was to try not to complete the act. Therefore the18-month-old infants who
 
could re-enact his“intended”acts actually failed to notice his actual goal directed intention,
and turned out to follow his hidden communicative intention.
In infant development studies in general,an experimenter’s communicative intentions are
 
often carefully controlled or eliminated, as in the above intention study, in which Meltzoff
 
writes that the experimenter maintained a friendly demeanor throughout the demonstrations,
and did not express joy at the infants successfully performing the act. Even in habituation
 
experiments,however,it is difficult to totally cut off messages of intention(hidden messages
 
to the participants)from invisible experimenters;in the situation of being brought into and
 
being set in a dark experimental room there is a clear message that you should look at a bright
 
screen that has been set there. Another difficulty we have observed is that infants who cannot
 
understand experimenters’intentions often tend to become fussy and drop out of the
 
experiments.
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In our study,conversely, the experimenter’s communicative intentions were fairly open.
The experimenter’s intentional action on objects(object-oriented intention)had a hierarchical
 
structure:achieving the goal of getting the car involved several sub-goals and sub-plans;
picking up the hammer,inserting it to the tunnel,pushing out the car and picking up the car
 
again. In consequence the adult’s communicative intention (person-oriented intention)was
 
also multi-tiered. In each stage,the adult tried to draw the infants’attention to each aspect
 
of her action and encouraged them to participate with her in the action. Even the youngest
 
infants participating in our experiments demonstrated that they were sensitive to the adult’s
 
communicative intention and tried to react to her requests. The infants looked into the adult’s
 
face and tried to read her communicative intention.
The role of infants’attention to the adult’s hand. The adult’s hand provided the infants
 
with relevant information for social learning of tool use. The hand moving attracted the
 
youngest infants,and gave clues to help them find the causality of agent-object and then object-
object. As the opaque tunnel hid the hammer pushing the car (the means)from the infants’
sight,they hardly noticed the car coming from the tunnel (the outcome)and their attention
 
remained on the hand that moved. In those instances,the adult’s pointing to the car or grasping
 
the car helped the infants to recognize the car. These results indicate that infants’attention to
 
an adult’s hand assures the developmental change toward sharing attention and intentions with
 
adults.
Even the youngest infants seemed to understand that hands cause an inanimate object’s
 
motion,i.e.they often related a hand and the object that had been handled. Saxe et al.(2005)
and Woodward (1999)reported that hands are categorized as an intentional agent. In our
 
experiments,however,the infants looked at the adult’s hand,and then looked at her face. This
 
suggests that what the infants categorized as an intentional agent was clearly not the hands
 
alone but the actor herself. The infants seemed to confirm the adult’s intentions (person-
oriented and object-oriented) that had appeared in the movement of the hand. In the
 
habituation paradigm,only hands without a figure of person are often used as stimuli(Saxe et
 
al.). The intriguing study by Meltzoff(1995),mentioned earlier in this discussion,measured
 
infants’social referencing to the caretaker who was holding the infant from behind,but not to
 
the presenter. Further research especially for young infants including focus on the question,
“whose intention do the infants look to for confirmation?”might be interesting as well.
Striano,Vaish, and Benigno (2006)discussed the meaning of infants’face-looks in the
 
social referencing situation using a “visual cliff.”They pointed out two kinds of meanings;
information seeking and comfort seeking. We definitely assume that both information and
 
comfort are needed for young children to attempt new challenges. Our study results suggest
 
that the infants’face-looks indicated their high concern for the communicative intention of the
 
adult,i.e.intention seeking,which can integrate information and comfort seeking. There was
 
a difference among the age groups when they looked at the adult’s face;the youngest group
 
looked at the face throughout almost the entire period of a trial. They seemed not to
 
understand what the adult wanted them to do,and to struggle,searching for her intention. The
 
older infants’looks increased in the last stage of a trial. They seemed to be confirming the
 
result of their own action or their joint engagement with the adult;confirming the goal reached
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or sharing the joy of their accomplishments.
The role of joint engagement with the adult. More success in joint engagement with the
 
adult was observable with the transparent tunnel,especially in10-month-olds and in12-month-
olds, compared with the opaque tunnel. Making the function of the hammer (the tool)
transparent to the infants facilitated their understanding and/or sharing the adult’s intention,
and thus increased their joint engagements with the adult. Moreover, through their joint
 
engagements, the infants could assure themselves of the goal (the car coming out)and the
 
means (the hammer pushing), and could understand the causality of objects. The infants
 
themselves initiated joint engagement by looking at the adult’s hand or the hammer in her hand,
and by touching or holding them. The youngest infants’joint engagement was less intentional
 
initially;they just paid attention to the adult’s hand moving, and adjusted their hand to the
 
movement without clearly sharing the goal. Eventually,though,they seemed to notice the goal
(the outcome),and then the means. These results indicate that joint engagement as well as
 
paying attention to the adult’s hand helps assure the developmental change toward sharing the
 
goal and intention with the adults.
The developmental process. Our results suggest three developmental changes in under-
standing the intentions of an adult’s goal-directed action,as follows:
１. Paying attention to the actor’s face and hand:Our observations suggest infants’attention
 
to an actor’s face indicated their searching for the actor’s intentions,and their attention to
 
the hand indicated that they began to recognize the actor as an agent who caused the
 
change of things.
２. Noticing the goal(the car was coming)and the means(the act of using the hammer)to
 
it. Sharing motivation to use the tool enabled the infants to participate in joint engage-
ment,but still without understanding of the role of the tunnel as an obstacle and how to use
 
the hammer.
３. Noticing the goal(the car was coming)and the means (the function of the hammer)to
 
it through their joint engagements. Based on their understanding the role of the tunnel as
 
an obstacle to getting the car,most of the infants tried to apply their own action plan.
In the transparent tunnel,the first developmental stage appeared in the6-month-olds,the
 
second in the10-month-olds,and the third in the12-month-olds. However,in the case of the
 
opaque tunnel,the cause mediating the effect of the adult’s action (the pushing of the car by
 
the hammer)inside the tunnel was invisible to the infants,and so noticing this goal was delayed
 
in all the age groups,and concordantly,the awareness of the actor’s using the hammer in the
6-month-olds and that of the actor’s effect on the car in the10-month-olds was also delayed.
Our results indicate that the19-month-olds and some of the 12-month-olds with the opaque
 
tunnel could imagine the causality of invisible things and relate the means to the goal. We
 
hypothesize that their concurrent developmental leap in language acquisition may have enabled
 
this dramatic shift. These infants’ability to imagine a part of other’s invisible action may
 
concord with Meltzoff’s study of 18-month-old children’re-enacting intended acts. While
 
Meltzoff (1995) showed that 18-month-old children understood the other’s intention and
 
accomplished his/her failed half way acts, a replication of that study reported that unlike
18-month-old infants,12-month-old infants do not have the ability to imagine the outcome that
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an intentional act might produce if they do not see that outcome produced (Bellagamba &
Tomasello,1999). They need to observe the full intentional act to see it as intentional.
As noted earlier,Tomasello et al.(2005)proposed a three-step developmental pathway of
 
infants’understanding intentional action;understanding animate action (3months), under-
standing pursuit of goals (9months), and understanding choice of plans (14months). Our
 
findings are consistent in principle with Tomasello’s three steps. However,this study differs
 
from the studies Tomasello referred to,in that those were not tool-use type and did not require
 
relating between objects;or only one object was used(Gergaly,Bekkering,& Kiraly,2002). In
 
the context of our tool use task,the infants needed to understand the function of the tool,in
 
other words,the causal relation among the objects,which made it more challenging to reach
 
Tomasello’s third stage. Furthermore,the infants actually had no effective choices but to use
 
the hammer to get the car. Tomasello proposed the distinction between goal and intention;an
 
intention is a plan of action in pursuing a goal,and an intention thus includes both a means
(action plan)and goals. In this framework,it is likely that our12-month-old infants with the
 
transparent tunnel stopped short at sharing the adult’s intention;they put their fingers into the
 
tunnel in vain. We believe,however,that this represents their own action plan to pursue the
 
goal,by following the movement of the car with their fingers instead,which would locate them
 
at a preliminary step toward Tomasello’s third stage. Acquiring skill at using a hammer by
 
themselves would be the next challenge for infants at this stage. Further research with infants
 
focusing on the ages of twelve to eighteen months may clarify whether joint engagement with
 
adults would also effectively improve the infant’s motor skill in using tools as well as the
 
infant’s understanding intentions.
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